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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court, 
dated August 7, 1996, granting petitioner-appellee Michael 
C. Barry's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district 
court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction to 
consider Barry's petition because his community service 
obligation constituted custody for purposes of habeas 
corpus review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254(a). The district 
court further held that, because the media coverage at 
issue had the potential to prejudice one or more jurors, the 
trial judge's failure to voir dire the jurors violated Barry's 
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. In addition to 
granting the petition, the district court ordered that Barry 
be released from his community service obligation. The 
district court made no provision for the State to retry Barry. 
 
Respondents-appellants, the Bergen County Probation 
Department and Peter Verniero, the Attorney General of 
New Jersey (collectively, "the State"), contend that the 
district court erred in its determination that Barry was "in 
custody" for habeas corpus purposes and that the media 
coverage potentially prejudiced the jury. Moreover, the State 
argues that the district court erred by releasing Barry from 
his community service sentence without providing the State 
with an opportunity to retry him. 
 
We hold that Barry was "in custody" for purposes of 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(a) when he was resentenced in 1993 to 500 
hours of community service. We further hold that the media 
coverage at issue did not have the potential to prejudice the 
jury. Accordingly, the judgment will be reversed, and we 
need not consider whether the district court erred by failing 
to provide the State with an opportunity for retrial. 
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I.  
 
Dr. Michael Barry served as medical director of the Fort 
Lee Stress Relief Clinic. During its brief period of operation, 
845 patients generated 2,429 visits and 2,337 prescriptions 
for the drug Quaalude. Nearly every prescription was for 
forty-five tablets, regardless of a patient's prior history. 
 
Barry and a number of codefendants were indicted by the 
State of New Jersey on: sixteen counts of dispensing the 
drug Quaalude not in good faith in the course of 
professional medical practice, in violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. 
SS 24:21-9, :21-15 (West 1997), :21-19(a)(1), :21-19(b)(3) 
(repealed by L.1987, c. 106, S 25, operative July 9, 1987) 
(West 1997), and 2C:2-6 (West 1995); three counts of 
dispensing Quaalude and Diazepam, in violation of those 
same statutes; one count of maintaining a drug resort, in 
violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. SS 24:21-21(a)(6), :21-21(b) (West 
1997), and 2C:2-6; and one count of conspiracy to dispense 
the drug Quaalude not in good faith in the course of 
professional medical practice and to maintain a drug resort, 
in violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. SS 24:21-24(a) (West 1997), 
and 2C:5-2 (West 1995). The trial, which lasted almost five 
months, commenced on January 4, 1982. 
 
On February 18, 1982, the trial court became aware of 
two newspaper articles that appeared in the Herald 
Dispatch. The court admonished the jury: 
 
       There are just a few things I must call to your 
       attention, and one of them is that there have been 
       articles in the newspaper and they have been called to 
       my attention, about this case. 
 
        It's also been called to my attention that the articles 
       are not accurate. I am not critical of the articles in any 
       sense, that's none of my business what's in the article, 
       but it is our business to ask you not to read them. 
       Remember I said at the outset that you as the jury in 
       this case are the judges. You will be the judges in the 
       trial. You'll be the sole and final judges in this trial and 
       you'll have to decide this case based solely on the 
       evidence that you see and you hear that takes place in 
       this courtroom. I will continue to ask you, and if I don't 
       forget, I will be telling you this every day, I will remind 
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       you not to read the newspapers. If you see anything 
       anywhere close that has anything to do with this case, 
       don't read it, don't let anybody attempt to discuss the 
       case with you, don't discuss the case even among 
       yourselves. Keep an open mind until you heard [sic] all 
       sides, the entire case, not just the State's case, but the 
       defendants' side and the law as given by the Court at 
       the end of the trial, but as I said, there are articles, 
       some of it is on the front page here, and there may be 
       something on the TV. 
 
App. at 138-39. At the conclusion of the proceedings that 
day, the trial court reminded the jury of its earlier 
admonition regarding the press. 
 
As the trial continued, the court repeatedly cautioned the 
jury to refrain from discussing the case with anyone or 
reading anything in the newspapers even tangentially 
related to the case. On March 17, 1982, the trial court 
instructed the jury at the conclusion of the proceedings 
that day: 
 
All right. I think it's a good time to recess. 
 
        But before we do, members of the jury, you will recall 
       from time to time I have been cautioning the jury not 
       to discuss the case, and not to read anything that 
       might in any way have any effect on you as, as it 
       pertains to this case. And I would just remind you once 
       again, would you please continue to follow those same 
       instructions. 
 
        And, I think more and more now you can realize the 
       importance of what I said, that ultimately you will have 
       to decide this case solely and you will have to solely on 
       the evidence that you see and you hear in this 
       courtroom. And, if you read something elsewhere or if 
       someone talks to you or even if you talk among 
       yourselves, it would be very, very hard for you to 
       remember whether you heard it in the courtroom or 
       you read it somewhere or whether it was evidence in 
       this case. 
 
        So, it is -- nor if you should see something, don't 
       read it. If someone wants to talk to you, don't let them 
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       talk to you about the case. And, you will remember 
       that this has to do with this case and this was the 
       evidence in this case because some [sic] have to decide 
       it solely on the evidence that you see and hear in the 
       courtroom. 
 
App. at 145-46. 
 
On April 20, 1982, approximately two weeks before the 
jury received the case, the trial court issued the following 
admonition to the jury regarding an upcoming television 
program: 
 
        There is another thing that I must call to your 
       attention, also. It's come to my attention that a 
       television program is to be televised on Channel 4, 
       NBC, on Tuesday evening, that's today, which may 
       address topics which have been either examined or 
       referred to here incourt [sic] . . . . I'm not going to tell 
       you about a program and then tell you not to look at 
       it, but I have to do it that way, because you might 
       come on it by chance. So, the best way to do it is to tell 
       you about it and then tell you not to look at it, whether 
       someone reminds you and says you know, I saw 
       something, tell them not to talk about it. So, I'm going 
       to ask you not to view the program, and further, I 
       would ask, if possible, that the program not be 
       watched by other members of your family, if possible, 
       or if that's not done, that you not discuss or be present 
       during any discussion with either your family or 
       friends . . . . 
 
App. at 156-57. The following day, the court asked the 
jurors if anyone had viewed the television program in 
question, and no one answered in the affirmative. 
 
On May 13, 1982, the trial judge, at the conclusion of the 
entire case, charged the jury as follows: 
 
        Each defendant is entitled to have his case 
       determined from his or her own acts and statements 
       and the other evidence in the case which may be 
       applicable to him or to her. And you're here to 
       determine the guilt or innocence of the accused from 
       the evidence before you and you are not called upon to 
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       return a verdict as to the guilt or innocence of any 
       other person or persons. 
 
App. at 172. The jury received the case and commenced 
deliberations that afternoon. 
 
In the morning of May 14, 1982, during jury 
deliberations, counsel for one of Barry's codefendants 
brought to the court's attention that a newscast that had 
been broadcast on WINS radio the previous evening 
concerned hearings in Washington on methaqualone usage. 
A recording of the story was transcribed for the record: 
 
        "At a Senate Labor and Human Resources 
       Subcommittee hearing, Republican Senator Paula 
       Hawkins says 90% of the sleeping pills also called the 
       love drug is [sic] supplied illegally to young people in a 
       two billion dollar a year business." 
 
        Now the recording has the following statement from 
       Senator Hawkins'[s] testimony, "Under the guise of 
       affording legitimate medical services these clinics 
       provide a ready and accessible source of 
       pharmaceutical Quaaludes, primarily for white collar 
       young adults. The procedure is apparently quite 
       simple. Bring between seventy five [sic] and two 
       hundred dollars in cash, fill out a brief personal history 
       form, claim personal or job problems and trade the 
       cash for a prescription of thirty to forty-five 
       Quaaludes." 
 
        The broadcast thencontinues [sic], "Now Senator 
       Hawkins has introduced a bill to ban Quaaludes as a 
       so-called controlled substance. Hawkins says at least 
       130 people died from the drug last year. The Drug 
       Enforcement Administration says Quaaludes [are] 
       second in popularity among young people only to 
       marijuana." 
 
App. at 201. 
 
Counsel also brought to the court's attention an article in 
that day's Bergen Record entitled "Federal Drug Agency 
Targets Stress Relief Clinics." According to counsel, the 
articles concerned 
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       stress clinics and how they operate in a manner so 
       that a drug can be given out to young people who are 
       then abusers. They refer to people coming in paying 
       $125 for a fifteen to twenty minute visit to a stress 
       clinic in order to receive Quaalude prescriptions. 
 
App. at 178. The Record has the largest circulation in 
Bergen County. Counsel then requested that the court voir 
dire and sequester the jurors and the court instruct them 
not to read that day's issue of the Bergen Record. The 
request was denied. However, the court instructed: 
 
       You shouldn't read about the case . . . . You shouldn't 
       listen to the radio about anything that might pertain, 
       not only about this case but anything that might 
       pertain to anything relating to something that might 
       pertain to a related matter. And you shouldn't read 
       anything that might pertain to a related matter that 
       might affect you in this case. 
 
        So if you see or even think it might pertain to 
       something, put it aside. Don't read about it. Because 
       you have to decide this case solely on the evidence 
       that's been presented in this case . . . and not on 
       something that you heard on the radio or that you've 
       seen or that you will see, and there may be something 
       in the newspaper and I have to continuously guard 
       against that. And it never fails but that just at the time 
       when jurors are deliberating that some always thinks 
       [sic] something will be in the newspaper, something is 
       in the newspaper that they think might affect you in 
       your deliberations. 
         . . . So would you keep that in mind, not to read 
       anything. If you read a newspaper -- I can't keep you 
       from reading newspapers, but if something appears in 
       the newspaper that might affect you in this case, you 
       see the problems it creates. 
 
App. at 203-04. 
 
After lunch that same day, counsel for one of Barry's 
codefendants advised the court that an alternate juror was 
seen reading the Bergen Record. Counsel moved for a 
mistrial or dismissal of the alternates; both motions were 
 
                                7 
 
 
 
denied. The court stated: "The record will show there are no 
newspapers in the deliberating room." App. at 217. At the 
end of the day, the court again instructed the jury: 
 
       I would ask that you not read or listen to what's on the 
       radio or on the TV, and I don't know if there'll be 
       anything on, but it just so happens that usually 
       something does happen at atime [sic] like this, that 
       something appears on the TV or on the radio which 
       deals with perhaps substances that might be related or 
       connected in some way with things that might remind 
       you of this case. . . . 
 
        And it's so important that you bear in mind that in 
       deciding this case you should not in any way be 
       influenced by anything other than . . . what you've 
       seen in the case . . . particularly something as I say, 
       that appears in a newspaper article or on the radio. 
 
        I would, therefore, urge you very, very strongly, if you 
       could stay away from reading even a headline that 
       might indicate anything like that. Don't even get 
       anywhere near anything like that. 
 
App. at 221-22. 
 
On May 17, 1982, counsel for one of Barry's 
codefendants brought to the court's attention two 
newspaper articles: one about the case itself from the May 
15 issue of the Hudson Dispatch, with a six-column banner 
headline reading "Mistrial Denied in Fort Lee Pill Pushing 
Case," which reported sidebar conversations that someone 
had leaked to the press, and one from the May 16 issue of 
the Bergen Record entitled "New Jersey Weighs Ban Against 
Quaaludes," which mentioned Barry and other defendants 
and erroneously reported that they were linked to a stress 
relief center in Atlantic City that was under investigation. 
Counsel moved for the court to instruct the jurors not to 
read the newspapers at all and to voir dire them to 
determine whether any had seen the article. The motion 
was denied. At the end of the day, the court again 
instructed the jury: 
 
       [A]gain, I would ask you please, please don't read 
       anything -- and it's difficult for me to say don't read 
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       any newspaper because I'd like to ask you not to do 
       that, not to read and not to listen to TV and not to 
       listen to any radio, but I guess that's asking too much 
       for me to ask you to do that. I'd like to ask you to do 
       that but, again, I will caution you, please don't read 
       anything that might have the slightest -- if you see any 
       kind of a headline that might have anything to do with 
       any type of controlled dangerous substance or anything 
       that might have anything to do with any kind of a case, 
       even remotely, obviously you shouldn't be looking at it 
       or reading it. . . . And similarly, don't listen to anything 
       on the radio or TV. 
 
App. at 247-48. 
 
On May 18, 1982, the court again instructed: 
 
       Don't read anything in the newspapers that in any 
       way, shape or form might affect you in any possible 
       way because it is important that you decide this case 
       based on the evidence you've seen and heard or the 
       lack of evidence in the case. . . . [D]on't permit anyone 
       to discuss this case with you either on the telephone, 
       newspaper, radio, TV, et cetera. 
 
App. at 255. 
 
On May 19, 1982, the court instructed the jury "not to 
read, listen, not to let anyone discuss the case with you." 
App. at 262. 
 
On May 20, 1982, shortly after the jury resumed 
deliberations at 9:15 a.m., counsel brought to the court's 
attention an article in that day's issue of the Bergen Record 
with a six-column headline reading "Stress Center Jury 
Replays Drug User's Testimony." Although the State 
disputes that the jurors could have seen the paper because 
it usually comes out after 9:30 a.m., defense counsel 
represented to the court that he bought the paper 
"downstairs" in the courthouse before the jury began 
deliberating that day. Counsel again requested a voir dire of 
the jury, which request was denied. Later, the court 
instructed: 
 
       [O]nce again, I would caution you that you are not to 
       read anything in the newspapers. If any articles appear 
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       in the newspapers -- and the fact that articles appear 
       in the newspapers, even though they may be allegedly 
       a rehash of what occurs in court, you shouldn't read 
       anything because the fact that something appears, it is 
       not for the jury to read at all. You should rely only on 
       the testimony, the evidence that was heard in court 
       and not what you read in the newspaper and not what 
       you hear outside of court as I've indicated earlier.. . . 
       [D]o not read anything about the case. . . . I have to 
       explain the importance of it to you and not to permit 
       anyone to discuss the case with you, not to read 
       anything, not to listen to anything that in any way 
       might have some bearing on this case, that might 
       influence you in the case. 
 
App. at 272-73. Throughout most of the deliberations, the 
jury was sequestered during lunch breaks and supervised 
by a court officer during recess. 
 
On May 24, 1982, Barry was found guilty on seventeen 
of the twenty-one counts. He was sentenced to concurrent 
three-year probationary terms on each of the seventeen 
counts, contingent upon his completion of a 180-day jail 
term, and fined, in the aggregate, $85,425. He appealed his 
conviction, requesting that he be represented on appeal by 
a court-appointed attorney. The state court rejected this 
request and subsequently dismissed his appeal for lack of 
prosecution. His petition for certification to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court was denied. 
 
Barry filed a petition in the district court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus. He asserted that 
he was indigent and entitled to court-appointed counsel to 
prosecute his state appeal. The district court dismissed the 
petition for failure to exhaust state remedies. We vacated 
and remanded. Barry v. Brower, 774 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 
1985) (table). The district court thereafter granted Barry's 
petition, and we affirmed with instructions to the district 
court to order that Barry be released from state custody 
unless the state court entered an order within thirty days 
reinstating his state appeal and appointing counsel. See 
Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
Subsequently, the Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Appellate Division, affirmed Barry's conviction. In the 
 
                                10 
 
 
 
portion of the opinion that addressed the issue we face in 
this appeal, the court wrote: 
 
       When a trial court is presented with a post- 
       impanelment voir dire motion based upon the potential 
       jury exposure to trial publicity, the court must employ 
       a two-part inquiry. First, the court should determine if 
       the disseminated information has the capacity to 
       prejudice the defendant. If so, the court should then 
       determine whether there is a realistic possibility that 
       such information may have reached one or more of the 
       jurors. "Relevant considerations include the extent, 
       notoriety, and prominence of the media coverage, with 
       particular reference to the aspects found particularly 
       prejudicial by the Court." 
 
        "The procedure of questioning an impaneled jury 
       when prejudicial publicity threatens the fairness and 
       integrity of a defendant's trial should not be invoked 
       begrudgingly." Similarly, however, the existence of 
       some publicity relating to the defendant or the 
       proceedings will not automatically require that the 
       judge hold a voir dire. 
 
        In an appropriate case, an alternative to 
       sequestration exists in the judge's issuance of "clear 
       and definitive" instructions to the jury not to read or 
       listen to media reports of the trial, and to decide issues 
       only on the evidence presented in court. Where 
       cautionary instructions are appropriate and properly 
       given, there is a presumption that jurors acted in good 
       faith in following those instructions. Even where 
       several jurors have been exposed to a media report 
       about the case, a mistrial need not be directed if the 
       report does not mention any defendants by name and 
       the judge instructs the jury that the report had nothing 
       to do with the defendants. 
 
        Where juror prejudice is alleged, it is within the 
       discretion of the trial judge to determine whether relief 
       should be granted. On appeal, we will not reverse a 
       discretionary decision of the trial judge unless we are 
       satisfied that a manifest denial of justice resulted 
       below. Here, we have carefully reviewed all allegations 
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       of juror prejudice and find them clearly to be without 
       merit. We are satisfied that no manifest denial of 
       justice has occurred. 
 
        Regarding the articles concerning the case which 
       appeared in the Bergen Record and the Hudson 
       Dispatch, we note that nothing in the record indicates 
       the jurors actually or probably read them or heard 
       prejudicial media reports. Under these circumstances, 
       we find no prejudice resulting in a manifest denial of 
       justice occurred. 
 
State v. Barry, No. A-720-82T4, slip op. at 84-86 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 22, 1991) (per curiam) ("App. Div. 
Op.") (quoting State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 86, 89, 548 A.2d 
846, 867, 869 (1988)) (citations omitted). The New Jersey 
Supreme Court denied a petition for certification. 
 
Following the state court affirmance of his conviction, 
Barry was ordered to pay the fine. When he failed to do so, 
a motion seeking to hold him in contempt was filed by the 
Bergen County Probation Department. Concluding that 
Barry was unable to pay the fine, the state court entered an 
amended Judgment of Conviction, which ordered Barry, in 
lieu of paying the fine, to perform 500 hours of community 
service. Barry's probation supervision ended on or about 
February 1, 1993. 
 
This petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 
S 2254 was filed in the district court on July 12, 1994, 
when Barry was still obligated to complete his community 
service under the direction of the Morris County Probation 
Department. The petition named as respondents the Bergen 
County Probation Department and Peter Verniero, the 
Attorney General of New Jersey. His petition raises several 
issues, including whether the trial judge violated his Sixth 
Amendment rights by refusing to voir dire the jury during 
its deliberations concerning possible prejudice arising from 
media coverage of the case. 
 
The district court granted the petition, ordering that he 
be released from community service. It also held that his 
community service obligation constituted custody for 
habeas corpus purposes. In addition, the district court held 
that the media coverage during jury deliberations could 
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have potentially prejudiced one or more jurors and, 
therefore, the trial court's failure to voir dire the jury was 
an error of constitutional magnitude. The district court 
determined that the remaining claims had no merit. This 
appeal followed. 
 
The State raises three issues in this appeal. First, was 
Barry "in custody" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254(a)? 
Second, did the trial court's failure to voir dire or sequester 
the jury after becoming aware of the media attention the 
case received violate Barry's Sixth Amendment right to have 
his case tried by an impartial jury? Finally, did the district 
court err by failing to give the State the opportunity to retry 
Barry? We raise sua sponte the issue of whether, assuming 
Barry is "in custody," either of the respondents is his 
"custodian" for purposes of S 2254(a). 
 
II. 
 
Our appellate jurisdiction is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1291 and 2253. The district court determined it 
unnecessary to engage in any fact finding. Accordingly, we 
exercise plenary review over the district court's grant of 
habeas corpus. United States v. Cleary, 46 F.3d 307, 3019- 
10 (3d Cir. 1995); Lesko v. Owens, 881 F.2d 44, 50 (3d Cir. 
1989). This standard is derived from the purpose of a 
reviewing court in a habeas proceeding, which is to review 
state cases " `for violations of federal constitutional 
standards.' " Lesko, 881 F.2d at 50 (quoting Milton v. 
Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377, 92 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 
(1972)). 
 
III.  
 
A. Custody 
 
The first issue in this appeal is whether Barry was "in 
custody" for purposes of S 2254(a) when he was 
resentenced in 1993 to 500 hours of community service. 
Section 2254(a) provides that federal courts have 
jurisdiction to entertain an application for habeas relief 
only if a petitioner is "in custody" in violation of the laws, 
treaties, or Constitution of the United States. This 
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requirement "is designed to preserve the writ of habeas 
corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual 
liberty." Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351, 93 
S. Ct. 1571, 1574 (1973). In making a custody 
determination, a court looks to the date that the habeas 
petition was filed. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 
238-40, 88 S. Ct. 1556, 1559-61 (1968). 
 
Barry argued, and the district court agreed, that 
S 2254(a)'s custody requirement was satisfied because 
Barry was subject both to " `significant restraints on [his] 
liberty' . . . which were `not shared by the public 
generally,' " Dist. Ct. Op. at 6 (quoting Jones v. 
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240, 242, 83 S. Ct. 373, 376, 
377 (1963)), and " `some type of continuing governmental 
supervision.' " Id. (quoting Tinder v. Paula, 725 F.2d 801, 
803 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing Spring v. Caldwell, 692 F.2d 994, 
997-98 (5th Cir. 1982))). The State contends that the 
district court's conclusion is erroneous for two reasons. 
First, Barry's community service was imposed in lieu of his 
$85,000 fine, and his failure to complete community service 
would have resulted, at most, in the reimposition of the fine 
(or the proportional remainder thereof), rather than 
incarceration. Therefore, the State argues, Barry's case is 
indistinguishable from cases holding that the mere 
imposition of a fine is insufficient to constitute custody. 
Second, the State maintains that Barry was not subjected 
to the type of continuing governmental supervision usually 
associated with custody. In particular, the State points out 
that Barry took almost three years to complete his service, 
and that he had the ability to choose both the type of 
assignments as well as a specific schedule for completing 
these assignments. We conclude that the state has read 
S 2254(a)'s custody requirement too narrowly. 
 
While early Supreme Court decisions held that 
incarceration was required before a defendant was "in 
custody" for habeas corpus purposes, see Hensley, 411 
U.S. at 350 n.8, 93 S. Ct. at 1574 n.8, the Hensley Court 
noted that these decisions have not been cited by more 
recent Supreme Court decisions and "may no longer be 
deemed controlling." Id. Instead, the meaning of "custody" 
has been broadened so that, in the S 2254(a) context, it is 
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no longer limited to physical custody. See Justices of the 
Boston Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 301, 104 S. Ct. 
1805, 1810 (1984) (pretrial release on personal 
recognizance constitutes custody); Hensley, 411 U.S. at 
349-51, 93 S. Ct. at 1573-75 (release on personal 
recognizance pending execution of sentence constitutes 
custody); Jones, 371 U.S. at 240-43, 83 S. Ct. at 375-77 
(parole tantamount to custody); see also Barry, 864 F.2d at 
296 (probation constitutes custody for habeas corpus 
purposes). 
 
Despite this "subtle shift[ ]" in the custody requirement, 
see Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 1987), 
courts continue to recognize that this custody requirement 
is designed "to limit the availability of habeas review `to 
cases of special urgency, leaving more conventional 
remedies for cases in which the restraints on liberty are 
neither severe nor immediate.' " Poodry v. Tonawanda Band 
of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 894 (2d Cir.) (quoting 
Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351, 93 S. Ct. at 1575), cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 610 (1996). Accordingly, several 
courts have held that the imposition of a fine or restitution 
does not constitute "custody." See, e.g. , Barnickel v. United 
States, 113 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Michaud, 901 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1990) (per curiam); 
Dremann v. Francis, 828 F.2d 6, 7 (9th Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam). Likewise, several courts have held that the 
imposition of certain civil disabilities does not constitute 
"custody." See, e.g., Lefkowitz, , 816 F.2d at 20 (revocation 
of medical license is not custody); Lillios v. New Hampshire, 
788 F.2d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (fine and 
suspension of driver's license is not custody); Ginsberg v. 
Abrams, 702 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) 
(petitioner's removal from the bench, revocation of his 
license to practice law, and disqualification as a real estate 
broker and insurance agent is not custody). 
 
No court has so far determined whether community 
service constitutes custody for purposes of S 2254(a). 
However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently 
found custody where a petitioner was sentenced to fourteen 
hours of attendance at an alcohol rehabilitation program 
after being convicted of driving while intoxicated. See Dow 
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v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit, 995 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 
1993) (per curiam). The court made this determination even 
though the petitioner could schedule his service over a 
three-day or five-day period. Concluding that this was 
sufficient to constitute custody, the Ninth Circuit wrote: 
 
        The sentence in this case, requiring appellant's 
       physical presence at a particular place, significantly 
       restrains appellant's liberty to do those things which 
       free persons in the United States are entitled to do and 
       therefore must be characterized, for jurisdictional 
       purposes, as "custody." Appellant "cannot come and go 
       as he pleases." Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351, 93 S. Ct. at 
       1575. Moreover, appellant suffers a greater restraint 
       upon his liberty--mandatory class attendance--than 
       the restraint suffered by a person who is released upon 
       his own recognizance. See id. at 351-53, 93 S. Ct. at 
       1574-76. 
 
Id. at 923 (emphasis added). 
 We find the Dow decision quite compelling and analogous 
to this matter. Like the petitioner in Dow, the State did not 
monitor or restrict Barry's every act. Moreover, both 
petitioners were afforded a certain amount of flexibility to 
schedule when they would complete their respective 
obligations. Nevertheless, as the Ninth Circuit recognized, 
an individual who is required to be in a certain place--or in 
one of several places--to attend meetings or to perform 
services, is clearly subject to restraints on his liberty not 
shared by the public generally. 
 
Moreover, the State's reliance on the so-called "fine-only" 
cases does not alter this analysis. The instant case is 
readily distinguishable from cases in which courts have 
held that a fine-only sentence does not constitute custody, 
because such sentences implicate only property, not liberty. 
See Hanson v. Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit of 
Ill., 591 F.2d 404, 407 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979); see also 
Lefkowitz, 816 F.2d at 20 ("Habeas jurisprudence has 
traditionally been concerned with liberty rather than 
property, with freedom more than economics."); Ginsberg, 
702 F.2d at 49 (limitations on economic mobility do not 
constitute custody). It is also distinguishable from those 
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cases where the petitioner was barred only from pursuing 
certain means of livelihood, see Lefkowitz, 816 F.2d at 20; 
Ginsberg, 702 F.2d at 49; Harvey v. South Dakota, 526 F.2d 
840, 841 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), rather than, as here, 
required to perform a certain type of work. 
 
Equally unavailing is the State's contention that Barry 
was not "in custody" because he was not supervised on a 
continuous basis. As the Second Circuit recently noted in 
Poodry, 85 F.3d at 895, an analogous case involving 
banishment from an Indian tribe and reservation, 
" `[r]estraint' does not require `on-going supervision' or `prior 
approval.' " Id. ("While `supervision' (or harassment) by 
tribal officials or others acting on their behalf may be 
sporadic, that only makes it all the more pernicious. . . 
[because] the petitioners have no ability to predict if, when, 
or how their sentences will be executed."). But see 
Lefkowitz, 816 F.2d at 19 ("[H]e who seeks the succor of 
habeas corpus must be subject . . . `at the least, to some 
type of continuing governmental supervision.' "(quoting 
Tinder, 725 F.2d at 803)). While there is no suggestion that 
the Morris County Probation Community Service Program 
officials monitored Barry's every move, they nevertheless 
performed an oversight function and actually reported back 
to Bergen County Probation officials. See Letter from Peter 
N. Brill, Bergen County Probation Officer, to Arthur Safir, 
Deputy Attorney General, Appellate Division 2 (August 12, 
1994), App. at 126 ("Regrettably I have been informed that 
Mr. Barry has been less than cooperative with the Morris 
County Probation Community Service Program officials, and 
if he fails to cooperate, it is our intention to return the 
matter to Judge Moses for further disposition."). This level 
of supervision was clearly adequate. 
 
Finally, we are unpersuaded by the State's argument that 
Barry was not "in custody" because he did not face 
imminent incarceration. Custody is established whenever a 
restraint on liberty is either actual or imminent. See 
Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351, 93 S. Ct. at 1575; see also 
Poodry, 85 F.3d at 894 ("[A] court [must] judge the `severity' 
of an actual or potential restraint on liberty." (emphasis 
added)). Courts have inquired into the imminence and 
inevitability of incarceration in the fine-only cases only 
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because the fine itself represented no severe restraint on 
liberty. For example, the courts in Poodry and Dow, where 
the restraints were found to be sufficiently severe, did not 
even discuss this factor. But see Lefkowitz, 816 F.2d at 20 
("He who seeks the writ must be incarcerated, or under 
immediate threat of incarceration, in order to meet the 
custody requirement of the habeas statute."). Because we 
conclude that Barry's community service obligation 
imposed an actual, severe restraint on his liberty, we need 
not consider an alternative method for establishing custody, 
namely, the threat of imminent or inevitable incarceration. 
 
In sum, we hold that Barry's community service 
obligation constitutes custody for habeas corpus 
jurisdictional purposes. As part of his 1993 resentencing, 
Barry was ordered to perform 500 hours of community 
service under the direction of the Morris County 
Community Service Program. Although Barry was given 
approximately three years to complete this service, as well 
as options regarding the type and hours of service, there 
can be no doubt that these conditions significantly 
restrained his liberty "to do those things which in this 
country free [people] are entitled to do." Jones, 371 U.S. at 
243, 83 S. Ct. at 377. The district court correctly held that 
the community service obligation which Barry was required 
to complete constituted custody within the meaning of 
S 2254(a). 
 
B. The Proper Respondent(s) 
 
At the time he filed his petition, Barry was under the 
supervision of the Morris County Community Services 
Program. However, he named as respondents only the 
Attorney General and the Bergen County Probation 
Department. Because of this discrepancy, we raised sua 
sponte whether Barry named the correct respondent(s) and 
requested the parties to submit letter briefs on the issue. 
See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 
484, 494-95, 93 S. Ct. 1123, 1129 (1973) ("The writ of 
habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks 
relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is 
alleged to be unlawful custody."). 
 
In response to our request, both parties agree that the 
state court order of January 13, 1993 transferred Barry's 
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community service obligation to the Morris County 
Probation Community Service Program, and that Barry did 
not file his habeas petition until June 12, 1994. However, 
they disagree as to the implication of these dates. 
 
Barry contends that the Bergen County Probation 
Department, one of the named respondents, did not 
relinquish custody of either the case or of Barry himself as 
a result of the January 13 order. The order clearly states, 
"If this Sentence is not completed, the Fine shall be 
reinstated." App. at 123. Accordingly, Barry argues, they 
retained oversight and custody. He also points to the letter 
dated August 12, 1994 from the Chief Probation Officer of 
Bergen County to the Deputy Attorney General, which 
states that Bergen County Probation will "return the matter 
to Judge Moses for further disposition" if Barry fails to 
cooperate with the Morris County Community Service 
Program. App. at 125-26. Finally, Barry argues that as the 
Attorney General of New Jersey was listed as a respondent, 
and as he is the highest ranking law enforcement officer in 
New Jersey with overall supervisory authority and 
responsibility, he is clearly the custodian of Barry. 
 
The Attorney General's office asserts, by contrast, that 
Barry failed to name as a proper party-respondent either 
the particular probation officer responsible for his 
supervision or the official in charge of the probation agency. 
They also point to a letter attached to their response to this 
court's questions which explains that Barry was supposed 
to meet with a probation officer in Morris County, and once 
he had completed his community service obligation, the 
case would be closed. The Attorney General's office also 
argues that the Attorney General is not the proper 
respondent. 
 
We are not persuaded by the State's arguments. The 
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 2 of the Rules Governing 
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts 
("Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases") provides that where 
 
       [t]he applicant is in custody in any other manner 
       differing from [jail, prison, or other actual physical 
       restraint, or probation or parole] due to the effects of 
       the state action he seeks relief from[, t]he named 
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       respondent should be the attorney general of the state 
       wherein such action was taken. 
 
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 2(b), Rules Governing 
Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. S 2254 (1994). This text 
appears in the advisory committee note to Rule 2(b), 
governing cases where "the applicant is not presently in 
custody . . . but may be subject to such custody in the 
future[.]" Rule 2(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 
28 U.S.C. foll. S 2254 (1994). Nevertheless, the text of the 
Advisory Committee Note is written in broad language and 
is preceded by the explanation that it is "worthwhile to spell 
out the various situations which might arise and who 
should be named as respondent(s) for each situation." 
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 2(b), Rules Governing 
Section 2254 Cases; cf. Reimnitz v. State's Attorney of Cook 
County, 761 F.2d 405, 409 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The important 
thing is not the quest for a mythical custodian, but that the 
petitioner name as respondent someone (or some 
institution) who has both an interest in opposing the 
petition if it lacks merit, and the power to give the 
petitioner what he seeks if the petition has merit--namely, 
his unconditional freedom."). 
 
The State cites this note but, without explanation, 
asserts that the Attorney General was not Barry's 
custodian. Based on the plain language of the advisory 
committee note, the argument of the State must fail. We 
conclude that the Attorney General is properly named as a 
respondent in this matter. Moreover, because Bergen 
County authorities retained jurisdiction over Barry, they too 
were properly named as a respondent here. 
 
IV. 
 
Having determined that the district court did, in fact, 
have subject matter jurisdiction to consider Barry's 
petition, and that the proper respondents have been 
named, we now consider whether Barry's constitutional 
right to an impartial jury was violated. The district court 
found that Barry's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial was 
violated when the trial judge refused to voir dire the jury, 
which may have been exposed to prejudicial media 
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coverage. The State contends this conclusion is erroneous 
for several reasons: (1) the district court's determination 
that the media coverage had the potential to prejudice the 
jury was ill-founded; (2) even assuming the media coverage 
could potentially prejudice the jury, the district court erred 
by failing to accord appropriate deference to the state court 
finding that "nothing in the record indicates the jurors 
actually or probably read them or heard prejudicial media 
reports[,]" App. Div. Op. at 85; and (3) even assuming the 
jurors were exposed to potentially prejudicial media 
coverage, the district court erred by not requiring the 
habeas petitioner to demonstrate a higher level of prejudice 
than a defendant must show on direct review. Because we 
conclude that the media coverage did not have the potential 
to prejudice the jury, we need not reach the State's 
alternative arguments. 
 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees state criminal defendants the right to a trial by 
an impartial finder of fact. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 
719, 726, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2228 (1992); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 
U.S. 717, 721-22, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 1641-42 (1961). 1 In both 
civil and criminal cases on direct appeal, we 
 
       utilize a three step procedure to determine whether 
       publicity during the course of the trial has prejudiced 
       the jury. "First, a court determines whether the news 
       coverage is prejudicial. Second, if it is, the court 
       determines whether any jurors were exposed to the 
       coverage. Third, if exposure did occur, the court 
       examines the exposed jurors to determine if this 
       exposure compromised their impartiality." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court and both parties identify this right as stemming 
from the Sixth Amendment. This is not strictly correct. The Sixth 
Amendment, made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment, requires that serious criminal offenses be tried by a jury. 
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1447 
(1968). The Due Process Clause requires that a factfinder at a criminal 
trial, be it a judge or a jury, be impartial. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 727, 
112 S. Ct. at 2229 ("[D]ue process alone has long demanded that, if a 
jury is to be provided the defendant, regardless of whether the Sixth 
Amendment requires it, the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to 
the extent commanded by the Sixth Amendment."). 
 
                                21 
 
 
 
United States v. DiSalvo, 34 F.3d 1204, 1221-22 (3d Cir. 
1994) (quoting Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 709-10 (3d 
Cir. 1993)); see also Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Weatherwax, 20 F.3d 572, 574-78 (3d Cir. 1994) (utilizing 
this framework). 
 
To determine whether publicity during the course of a 
trial has prejudiced a jury, we must first consider whether 
the news coverage is prejudicial. See DiSalvo, 34 F.3d at 
1221 (quoting Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 709-10). We make the 
prejudice " `determination on the basis of an objective 
analysis by considering the probable effect of the allegedly 
prejudicial information on a hypothetical average juror.' " 
Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 710 (quoting United States v. Gilsenan, 
949 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1991)). "The likelihood of 
substantial prejudice turns on all of the surrounding 
circumstances, the most important being the nature of the 
information learned by the jurors and the manner in which 
it was conveyed." Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 1987). The party 
claiming prejudice has "the burden of demonstrating the 
likelihood of actual prejudice." Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 710. 
 
In two recent cases, we have held certain news 
broadcasts and publications to be non-prejudicial. In 
DiSalvo, 34 F.3d at 1222, the defendant claimed he had 
been prejudiced by news articles that "mentioned that he 
had twice been acquitted by federal juries, characterized 
him as a `mob lawyer,' [and] made reference to a prior 
charge of tax evasion levied against him." We concluded 
that the district court was correct in finding that "none of 
the publications" at issue "ma[de] reference to the fact that 
[the defendant] had committed a crime, had been convicted 
of a crime or had acknowledged that he was guilty of any 
conduct charged in the indictment." Id. We also noted that 
"while the `mob lawyer' characterization was not necessarily 
flattering to [the defendant], use of this term is not 
sufficiently prejudicial to constitute a violation of [his] Sixth 
Amendment rights." Id. 
 
In Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 92, the appellants contended 
that they had been prejudiced by a news article and a 
television broadcast concerning a plea agreement ultimately 
rejected by the district court. The news reports stated that 
 
                                22 
 
 
 
the government conceded it had a weak case and that the 
appellants maintained their innocence. The reports 
criticized the government for attempting to dispose quietly 
of a controversial case in which it had little confidence and 
noted that the district court rejected the agreement because 
it did not provide for incarceration of the appellants. We 
held that these reports were not prejudicial from an 
objective viewpoint because they cast the government but 
not the appellants in a bad light. See also United States v. 
DeLarosa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1062 (3d Cir. 1971) (no potential 
for prejudice from news story concerning shots fired into 
home of government's chief witness where perpetrator was 
unknown). 
 
Some of our decisions would appear to be in tension with 
the above holdings. In Weatherwax, 20 F.3d at 574, we 
found prejudice. The article at issue seriously misquoted 
the defendant's testimony to make it appear as if he had 
cocked the gun and taken aim before he shot the victim. 
The inaccuracies severely undercut the defendant's self- 
defense theory. See also DiSalvo, 34 F.3d at 1222 n.16 
(distinguishing Weatherwax). 
 
In Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 711, which concerned a trial over 
damages resulting from an automobile accident that 
rendered the plaintiff a quadriplegic, we found prejudicial a 
news story concerning a $30 million verdict rendered for a 
plaintiff in another case who was rendered a quadriplegic 
after a shooting. We deemed it highly relevant that the 
media reports "placed before the jury the very same type of 
information the district court had excluded as 
inadmissible." Id. at 707. See also United States v. Bertoli, 
40 F.3d 1384, 1395 (3d Cir. 1994) (in Waldorf, "the 
circumstances posed a serious risk that an extraneous and 
inadmissible newspaper article may have vitiated 
procedural rulings based on fairness to both sides"). We 
also noted that the article involved a "factually similar . . . 
case," even though it was "completely unrelated," Waldorf, 
3 F.3d at 712 n.7, and that the jury was exposed to it the 
night before and the day of its verdict. 
 
In Dowling, 814 F.2d at 135-36, a newspaper article 
published during trial revealed that the defendant had 
previously been convicted of bank robbery, the same crime 
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with which he was charged in that case. We concluded that 
information concerning the defendant's prior criminal 
conduct had the potential for prejudice. 
 
Finally, in United States ex rel. Greene v. New Jersey, 
519 F.2d 1356, 1357 (3d Cir. 1975) (per curiam), we held 
that information concerning the defendant's attempt to 
enter a plea of non vult was prejudicial. The Gilsenan court 
distinguished Greene based on the fact that the defendant 
in Greene, rather than the state, had initiated plea 
negotiations, and that he had been willing to expose himself 
to a life sentence by pleading guilty. See Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 
at 96-97 n.11. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that all of the 
publications and broadcasts at issue are non-prejudicial. 
We observe that the headline of the May 15 article in the 
Hudson Dispatch, using the derogatory term "pill pushing," 
and the headline of the May 20 article in the Bergen Record 
calling a witness a "drug user," are certainly no more 
prejudicial than the use of the term "mob lawyer" in 
DiSalvo, 34 F.3d at 1222. Indeed, the terms "pill pushing" 
and "drug user" do not directly refer to Barry and are less 
prejudicial than "mob lawyer," which we held to be "not 
sufficiently prejudicial to constitute a violation of [the 
defendant's] Sixth Amendment rights." Id. Likewise, we are 
unable to find that Barry was prejudiced by the May 20 
article simply because it reported that the trial court denied 
a motion for a mistrial. Cf. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 95 (no 
prejudice by reports that district court rejected proposed 
plea agreement). 
 
We also conclude that the Bergen Record article of May 
16, which mentioned Barry by name and incorrectly 
reported that he had ties to a second stress relief center 
that was under investigation, is not prejudicial under the 
reasoning of DiSalvo. In DiSalvo, the court held that the 
media reports at issue were not prejudicial because they 
did not state that the defendant committed a crime, was 
convicted of a crime, or acknowledged guilt of any conduct 
charged in the indictment. Here, there were allegations only 
that Barry had ties to another clinic that was under 
investigation, a far cry from stating that he was actually 
guilty of or had been convicted of another crime. Further, 
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the fact that the report was inaccurate adds little. Even 
assuming the reports had been accurate, they were not 
prejudicial under DiSalvo. 
 
Finally, we conclude that the May 14 WINS radio 
broadcast of Senator Hawkins's testimony, and the Bergen 
Record article of the same date recounting Senator 
Hawkins's testimony, were not prejudicial so as to deny 
Barry his Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial jury. 
While the Senator's testimony concerned a factually similar 
yet completely unrelated case, the similarity with our 
decision in Waldorf ends there. As we observed in Bertoli, 
the Waldorf court accorded significant weight to the fact 
that the jury was exposed to " `the very same type of 
information the district court had excluded as 
inadmissible.' " Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1395 (quoting Waldorf, 3 
F.3d at 707). This exposure "may have vitiated procedural 
rulings based on fairness to both sides." Id. It is also 
important to note that the Waldorf court found it 
"significant" . . . that "the jury was exposed to the Queens 
verdict both the night before and the very same day that it 
reached a verdict on Waldorf 's damage claim." Waldorf, 3 
F.3d at 713. Here, no such concerns are present. There is 
no suggestion that media coverage of the Senator's 
testimony vitiated any of the trial court's procedural 
rulings. Moreover, the verdict was rendered ten days after 
the reports were broadcast. Waldorf does not assist the 
petitioner. 
 
We hold that the district court erred as a matter of law 
by concluding that the media coverage at issue had the 
potential to prejudice one or more jurors. Because the 
media coverage was not prejudicial, we need not consider 
the second and third parts of the three-part procedure set 
forth in DiSalvo. Nor do we consider whether the district 
court erred by failing to provide the State with an 
opportunity to retry the petitioner. 
 
V. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be reversed. The 
matter will be remanded to the district court with a 
direction to dismiss the petition. 
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STAPLETON, J., Circuit Judge, Dissenting: 
 
On January 13, 1993, Barry pled guilty to violating his 
probation by failing to pay an $85,000 fine. The court then 
entered an order providing as follows: 
 
       The defendant shall serve five hundred (500) hours of 
       Community Service: upon completion of this sentence 
       the $85,000.00 Fine previously imposed shall be 
       forgiven. If this Sentence is not completed, the Fine 
       shall be reinstated. 
 
App. at 123. Barry's term of probation ended one month 
later on February 1, 1993. 
 
Barry filed his petition initiating this proceeding on July 
12, 1994. As of that date, he had not completed his 500 
hours of community service. On August 24, 1994, the 
Vicinage Chief Probation Officer responded to an inquiry 
from the New Jersey Attorney General's Office as follows: 
 
       If I understand your inquiry correctly, you are 
       interested in being advised as to whether or not Mr. 
       Barry is currently under Probation supervision. He is 
       not, but he is still obligated to perform the fullfive 
       hundred hours of community service. 
 
App. at 126. 
 
The foregoing is the sum total of the record information 
concerning Barry's status at the time he filed his petition. 
On this record, I would hold that he has not carried his 
burden of establishing the jurisdiction of the district court 
to entertain his petition. See Charles Allen Wright, et al., 
Federal Practice and Procedure, S 3522 at 63-65 (2d ed. 
1984). 
 
Section 2254(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code 
provides: 
 
        The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit 
       judge, or a district court shall entertain an application 
       for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 
       custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only 
       on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 
       Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 
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(emphasis added). 
 
It is well settled that a person whose only obligation is to 
pay a criminal fine is not "in custody" for purposes of 
S 2254. See, e.g., United States v. Watroba, 56 F.3d 28, 29 
(6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Segler, 37 F.3d 1131, 1137 
(5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Michand, 901 F.2d 5 (1st 
Cir. 1990). This is true because such a person's liberty is 
not currently restrained, even though there is the potential 
that he may be incarcerated in the future if thefine is not 
paid. The potential for future incarceration is insufficient 
to confer jurisdiction because the person can avoid 
incarceration by meeting his obligation and thus holds the 
"keys to the prison" in his pocket. See Dremann v. Francis, 
828 F.2d 6, 7 (9th Cir. 1987); Tinder v. Paula, 725 F.2d 
801, 804 (1st Cir. 1984). 
 
This record does not suggest that Barry's liberty was 
restrained when he filed his petition. Unlike a person on 
probation, he was apparently free to come and go as he 
wished. He was not obligated to secure the consent of a 
probation officer when he decided where or how he would 
live or what his activities would be on any given day. He 
had no unfulfilled sentence hanging over his head that he 
might be required to serve at any point. He was simply 
required to donate 500 hours of community service of an 
unspecified nature on an unspecified schedule.1 If he 
should fail to meet this obligation within a reasonable 
period of time, his fine would be reinstated pursuant to the 
court's order. In the meantime, he held the keys to the 
prison in his pocket. 
 
I realize that the Supreme Court of the United States in 
recent decades has expanded the concept of "custody" for 
purposes of S 2254 beyond physical incarceration. It has 
never, however, held anyone to be in "custody" who enjoyed 
the freedom that Barry enjoyed at the time he filed his 
petition. In my view, he was in a position not materially 
different from a person whose only obligation to the state is 
the payment of a fine, and I would follow the well- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The government represents that Barry was free to choose the service 
he would undertake and the hours of his performance. Appellant's Brief 
at 24. Barry does not contest this representation. 
 
                                27 
 
 
 
established precedent holding that such a person is not "in 
custody." 
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